ABOUT LOKPALL

About Lokpal

• Deficiencies in our present anti-corruption systems
• Salient features of Jan Lokpal Bill
• Jan Lokpal Bill will improve existing anti-corruption systems
• Our critique of Government’s Lokpal Bill
• Should the Prime Minister be brought within the purview of the proposed Lokpal?
• Should the judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court be brought within the purview of the proposed Lokpal?

Deficiencies in the present anti-corruption systems Central Government level:

At central Government level, there is Central Vigilance Commission, Departmental vigilance and CBI. CVC and Departmental vigilance deal with vigilance (disciplinary proceedings) aspect of a corruption case and CBI deals with criminal aspect of that case.

Central Vigilance Commission: CVC is the apex body for all vigilance cases in Government of India.

• However, it does not have adequate resources commensurate with the large number of complaints that it receives. CVC is a very small set up with a staff strength less than 200. It is supposed to check corruption in more than 1500 central government departments and ministries, some of them being as big as Central Excise, Railways, Income Tax etc. Therefore, it has to depend on the vigilance wings of respective departments and forwards most of the complaints for inquiry and report to them. While it monitors the progress of these complaints, there is delay and the complainants are often disturbed by this. It directly enquires into a few complaints on its own, especially when it suspects motivated delays or where senior officials could be implicated. But given the constraints of manpower, such number is really small.
• CVC is merely an advisory body. Central Government Departments seek CVC’s advice on various corruption cases. However, they are free to accept or reject CVC’s advice. Even in those cases, which are directly enquired into by the CVC, it can only advise government. CVC mentions these cases of non-acceptance in its monthly reports and the Annual Report to Parliament. But these are not much in focus in Parliamentary debates or by the media.
• Experience shows that CVC’s advice to initiate prosecution is rarely accepted and whenever CVC advised major penalty, it was reduced to minor penalty. Therefore, CVC can hardly be treated as an effective deterrent against corruption.
• CVC cannot direct CBI to initiate enquiries against any officer of the level of Joint Secretary and above on its own. The CBI has to seek the permission of that department, which obviously would not be granted if the senior officers of that department are involved and they could delay the case or see to it that permission would not be granted.
• CVC does not have powers to register criminal case. It deals only with vigilance or disciplinary matters.
• It does not have powers over politicians. If there is an involvement of a politician in any case, CVC could at best bring it to the notice of the Government. There are several cases of serious corruption in which officials and political executive are involved together.
• It does not have any direct powers over departmental vigilance wings. Often it is seen that CVC forwards a complaint to a department and then keeps sending reminders to them to enquire and send report. Many a times, the departments just do not comply. CVC does not have any really effective powers over them to seek compliance of its orders.
• CVC does not have administrative control over officials in vigilance wings of various central government departments to which it forwards corruption complaints. Though the government does consult CVC before appointing the Chief Vigilance Officers of various departments, however, the final decision lies with the government. Also, the officials below CVO are appointed/transferred by that department only. Only in exceptional cases, if the CVO chooses to bring it to the notice of CVC, CVC could bring pressure on the Department to revoke orders but again such recommendations are not binding.
• Appointments to CVC are directly under the control of ruling political party, though the leader of the Opposition is a member of the Committee to select CVC and VCs. But the Committee only considers names put up before it and that is decided by the Government. The appointments are opaque.
• CVC Act gives supervisory powers to CVC over CBI. However, these supervisory powers have remained ineffective. CVC does not have the power to call for any file from CBI or to direct them to do any case in a particular manner. Besides, CBI is under administrative control of DOPT rather than CVC.
• Therefore, though CVC is relatively independent in its functioning, it neither has resources nor powers to enquire and take action on complaints of corruption in a manner that meets the expectations of people or act as an effective deterrence against corruption.

Departmental Vigilance Wings: Each Department has a vigilance wing, which is manned by officials from the same department (barring a few which have an outsider as Chief Vigilance Officer. However, all the officers under him belong to the same department).

• Since the officers in the vigilance wing of a department are from the same department and they can be posted to any position in that department anytime, it is practically impossible for them to be independent and objective while inquiring into complaints against their colleagues and seniors. If a complaint is received against a senior officer, it is impossible to enquire into that complaint because an officer who is in vigilance today might get posted under that senior officer some time in future.
• In some departments, especially in the Ministries , some officials double up as vigilance officials. It means that an existing official is given additional duty of vigilance also. So, if some citizen complaints against that officer, the complaint is expected to be enquired into by the same officer. Even if someone complaints against that officer to the CVC or to the Head of that Department or to any other authority, the complaint is forwarded by all these agencies and it finally lands up in his own lap to enquire against himself. Even if he recuses himself from such inquiries , still they have to be handled by those who otherwise report to him. There are indeed examples of such absurdity.
• There have been instances of the officials posted in vigilance wing by that department having had a very corrupt past. While in vigilance, they try to scuttle all cases against themselves. They also turn vigilance wing into a hub of corruption, where cases are closed for consideration.
• Departmental vigilance does not investigate into criminal aspect of any case. It does not have the powers to register an FIR.
• They also do not have any powers against politicians.
• Since the vigilance wing is directly under the control of the Head of that Department, it is practically impossible for them to enquire against senior officials of that department.
• Therefore, , the vigilance wing of any department is seen to softpedal on genuine complaints or used to enquire against " inconvenient" officers.

CBI: CBI has powers of a police station to investigate and register FIR. It can investigate any case related to a Central Government department on its own or any case referred to it by any state government or any court.

• CBI is overburdened and does not accept cases even where amount of defalcation is alleged to be around Rs 1 crore.
• CBI is directly under the administrative control of Central Government.
• So, if a complaint pertains to any minister or politician who is part of a ruling coalition or a bureaucrat who is close to them, CBI's credibility has suffered and there is increasing public perception that it cannot do a fair investigation and that it is influenced to to scuttle these cases.
• Again, because CBI is directly under the control of Central Government, CBI is perceived to have been often used to settle scores against inconvenient politicians.

Therefore, if a citizen wants to make a complaint about corruption by a politician or an official in the Central Government, there isn’t a single anti-corruption agency which is effective and independent of the government, whose wrongdoings are sought to be investigated. CBI has powers but it is not independent. CVC is independent but it does not have sufficient powers or resources.

Critique of Government’s Lokpal Bill 2010

(Proposed to be passed as an ordinance by the Central government)

UPA government has been under constant attack due to exposure of one scam after the other on the issue of corruption. In order to salvage its image, the government proposes to set up an institution of Lokpal to check corruption at high places. However the remedy seems to be worse than the disease. Rather than strengthening anti corruption systems, this bill if passed, will end up weakening whatever exists in the name of anti corruption today.

The principal objections to government’s proposal are as follows:

• Lokpal will not have any power to either initiate action suo motu in any case or even receive complaints of corruption from general public. The general public will make complaints to the speaker of Lok Sabha or chairperson of Rajya Sabha. Only those complaints forwarded by Speaker of Lok Sabha/ Chairperson of Rajya Sabha to Lokpal would be investigated by Lokpal. This not only severely restricts the functioning of Lokpal, it also provides a tool in the hands of the ruling party to have only those cases referred to Lokpal which pertain to political opponents (since speaker is always from the ruling party). It will also provide a tool in the hands of the ruling party to protect its own politicians.
• Lokpal has been proposed to be an advisory body. Lokpal, after enquiry in any case, will forward its report to the competent authority. The competent authority will have final powers to decide whether to take action on Lokpal’s report or not. In the case of cabinet ministers, the competent authority is Prime Minister. In the case of PM and MPs the competent authority is Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha, as the case may be. In the coalition era when the government of the day depends upon the support of its political partners, it will be impossible for the PM to act against any of his cabinet ministers on the basis of Lokpal’s report. For instance, if there were such a Lokpal today and if Lokpal made a recommendation to the PM to prosecute A. Raja, obviously the PM will not have the political courage to initiate prosecution against A. Raja. Likewise, if Lokpal made a report against the PM or any MP of the ruling party, will the house ever pass a resolution to prosecute the PM or the ruling party MP? Obviously, they will never do that.
• The bill is legally unsound. Lokpal has not been given police powers. Therefore Lokpal cannot register an FIR. Therefore all the enquiries conducted by Lokpal will tantamount to “preliminary enquiries”. Even if the report of Lokpal is accepted, who will file the chargesheet in the court? Who will initiate prosecution? Who will appoint the prosecution lawyer? The entire bill is silent on that.
• The bill does not say what will be the role of CBI after this bill. Can CBI and Lokpal investigate the same case or CBI will lose its powers to investigate politicians? If the latter is true, then this bill is meant to completely insulate politicians from any investigations whatsoever which are possible today through CBI.
• There is a strong punishment for “frivolous” complaints. If any complaint is found to be false and frivolous, Lokpal will have the power to send the complainant to jail through summary trial but if the complaint were found to be true, the Lokpal will not have the power to send the corrupt politicians to jail! So the bill appears to be meant to browbeat, threaten and discourage those fighting against corruption.
• Lokpal will have jurisdiction only on MPs, ministers and PM. It will not have jurisdiction over officers. The officers and politicians do not indulge in corruption separately. In any case of corruption, there is always an involvement of both of them. So according to government’s proposal, every case would need to be investigated by both CVC and Lokpal. So now, in each case, CVC will look into the role of bureaucrats while Lokpal will look into the role of politicians. Obviously the case records will be with one agency and the way government functions it will not share its records with the other agency. It is also possible that in the same case the two agencies arrive at completely opposite conclusions. Therefore it appears to be a sure way of killing any case.
• Lokpal will consist of three members, all of them being retired judges. There is no reason why the choice should be restricted to judiciary. By creating so many post retirement posts for judges, the government will make the retiring judges vulnerable to government influences just before retirement as is already happening in the case of retiring bureaucrats. The retiring judges, in the hope of getting post retirement employment would do the bidding of the government in their last few years.
• The selection committee consists of Vice President, PM, Leaders of both houses, Leaders of opposition in both houses, Law Minister and Home minister. Barring Vice President, all of them are politicians whose corruption Lokpal is supposed to investigate. So there is a direct conflict of interest. Also selection committee is heavily loaded in favor of the ruling party. Effectively ruling party will make the final selections. And obviously ruling party will never appoint strong and effective Lokpal.
• Lokpal will not have powers to investigate any case against PM, which deals with foreign affairs, security and defence. This means that corruption in defence deals will be out of any scrutiny whatsoever. It will become impossible to investigate into any Bofors in future.

Therefore, the draft Lokpal ordinance is eyewash, a sham. It is sad that despite so much of embarrassment caused to UPA due to so many scams, UPA is still making a fool of the people in the form of this draft ordinance.

Jan Lokpal Bill will improve existing anti-corruption systems.

Existing System	System Proposed by civil society
No politician or senior officer ever goes to jail despite huge evidence because Anti Corruption Branch (ACB) and CBI directly come under the government. Before starting investigation or initiating prosecution in any case, they have to take permission from the same bosses, against whom the case has to be investigated.	Lokpal at centre and Lokayukta at state level will be independent bodies. ACB and CBI will be merged into these bodies. They will have power to initiate investigations and prosecution against any officer or politician without needing anyone’s permission. Investigation should be completed within 1 year and trial to get over in next 1 year. Within two years, the corrupt should go to jail.
No corrupt officer is dismissed from the jobbecause Central Vigilance Commission, which is supposed to dismiss corrupt officers, is only an advisory body. Whenever it advises government to dismiss any senior corrupt officer, its advice is never implemented.	Lokpal and Lokayukta will have complete powers to order dismissal of a corrupt officer. CVC and all departmental vigilance will be merged into Lokpal and state vigilance will be merged into Lokayukta.
No action is taken against corrupt judgesbecause permission is required from the Chief Justice of India to even register an FIR against corrupt judges.	Lokpal & Lokayukta shall have powers to investigate and prosecute any judge without needing anyone’s permission.
Nowhere to go - People expose corruption but no action is taken on their complaints.	Lokpal & Lokayukta will have to enquire into and hear every complaint.
There is so much corruption within CBI and vigilance departments. Their functioning is so secret that it encourages corruption within these agencies.	All investigations in Lokpal & Lokayukta shall be transparent. After completion of investigation, all case records shall be open to public. Complaint against any staff of Lokpal & Lokayukta shall be enquired and punishment announced within two months.
Weak and corrupt people are appointed as heads of anti-corruption agencies.	Politicians will have absolutely no say in selections of Chairperson and members of Lokpal & Lokayukta. Selections will take place through a transparent and public participatory process.
Citizens face harassment in government offices. Sometimes they are forced to pay bribes. One can only complaint to senior officers. No action is taken on complaints because senior officers also get their cut.	Lokpal & Lokayukta will get public grievances resolved in time bound manner, impose a penalty of Rs 250 per day of delay to be deducted from the salary of guilty officer and award that amount as compensation to the aggrieved citizen.
Nothing in law to recover ill gotten wealth.A corrupt person can come out of jail and enjoy that money.	Loss caused to the government due to corruptionwill be recovered from all accused.
Small punishment for corruption- Punishment for corruption is minimum 6 months and maximum 7 years.	Enhanced punishment - The punishment would be minimum 5 years and maximum of life imprisonment.

Should the Prime Minister be brought within the purview of the proposed Lokpal?

The Lokpal Is only an investigative body. If someone comes with credible proof of corruption by the PM, No less than seven members of the eleven members of Lokpal will look into the evidence and decide whether to investigate the PM or not. If it is a frivolous or unsubstantiated complaint, the complainant will be suitably punished. If the complaint has substance the Lokpal will investigate the matter. The 5 ministers from the government said that if any enquiry starts against the PM, the PM would lose all authority to govern and take decisions. We reminded them that in Bofors case also, the then PM was under scanner. But that did not deter him from taking decisions. If the PM takes many portfolios under himself, then all those ministries will become exempt according to the governments logic. Even in this governments own Lokpal bill, the PM was included with some qualifications. Even today, the CBI can investigate the PM but the problem is that the CBI is under the PM’s administrative control so effective investigation is not possible due to conflicts of interest. Therefore, we believe that the PM cannot be exempted from corruption investigation by the Lokpal.

Should the judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court be brought within the purview of the proposed Lokpal?

Today, if there is an allegation of corruption against any Supreme Court (SC) or High Court (HC) judge, an FIR cannot be registered and investigations cannot be started into those allegations without the permission of the Chief Justice of India (CJI). Experience shows that Chief Justices have hesitated in giving permissions, despite overwhelming evidence of corruption being presented against any judge.

Historically, even those Chief Justices, who have been well known for their honesty, have not granted these permissions. For instance, Mr. P Chidambaram sought permission to register an FIR against Justice Sen Gupta of Kolkatta High Court. Permission was sought from the then Chief Justice of India, Justice Venkatachaliah, who is very well known for his integrity. However, Justice Venkatachaliah did not grant permission. Was the evidence against Justice Sen Gupta strong enough? The strength of the evidence can be gauged from the fact that Justice Sen Gupta was raided and arrested soon after he retired because after retirement, permission of CJI was not required!

There are many more instances when permission for registration of FIR has been denied. Some such cases are mentioned below:

• Despite overwhelming evidence, request of the Campaign on Judicial Accountability (represented by Shanti Bhushan, Prashant bhushan, Ram jethmalani, Justice Rajender Sachhar, Indira jaisingh, Arvind Nigam etc) seeking permission to register an FIR against Justice Bhalla of Allahabad High Court is pending before the Chief Justice of India since 2006.
• Similarly, the request of Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Judicial Reforms seeking to register FIR against Justice F I Rebello is pending since September 2010. Therefore, the present system of seeking permission from the CJI to register an FIR against a judge of SC or HC appears to have protected the corrupt and encouraged corruption in higher judiciary.

Proposal:

A perception that the judiciary is being brought under the control of Jan Lokpal has unfortunately been created. This is a myth that is being falsely propagated and it is completely incorrect.

What is being proposed is that the permission to register FIR against corruption of any judge should be granted by a seven member bench of Jan Lokpal (the bench may have majority of judicial members) rather than the Chief Justice of India. That is the only real difference in the system proposed in Jan Lokpal Bill and the existing system.

Post registration of an FIR, the police or CBI investigates and prosecutes (if a case is made out) under the existing system. Since we are proposing that the anti corruption branch of CBI would be merged into Jan Lokpal and would form the investigation and prosecution wing of Jan Lokpal, therefore, obviously the investigations and prosecution after registration of FIR is proposed to be done by the new investigation and prosecution wing of Lokpal.

Therefore, effectively, there is just one change being proposed from the existing system – that rather than CJI giving permission to register FIR, a seven member bench of Lokpal should grant such permission.

Critique of our proposal	Our response
This would affect the independence of judiciary.	How will it affect the independence of judiciary? We have greatest respect for our judiciary and we strongly stand for its independence. Most of the judges in higher judiciary are honest. However, a few of them bring bad name to the whole judiciary due to their wrongdoings. They ought to be identified and acted against. A system which effectively does that would strengthen the independence of judiciary and increase its credibility in the eyes of the public. Present system tends to protect the corrupt and encourages corruption. Therefore, the present system tends to lower the prestige and credibility of judiciary in the minds of the people and compromises its independence. Jan Lokpal Bill seeks to create a system, which is independent of judiciary, to grant permission to register an FIR and initiate investigations against a judge.
This would tremendously increase the workload of Lokpal	There are less than 1000 SC and HC judges in our country. Justice S P Bharucha had once commented that less than 20% of higher judiciary is corrupt. Obviously, complaints will not come against all of them at the same time. But even if all complaints came together, there will be less than 200 complaints. That is a very small number and would not increase the workload of Lokpal in any manner.
Judicial matters are very technical. Therefore, Only people from judiciary should deal with complaints against judges.	Jan Lokpal Bill does not empower Lokpal to go into or question the judicial procedures or decisions of judiciary. It does not empower Lokpal to interfere with the professional (mis)conduct of judges. It only empowers them to grant permission to register an FIR against a judge against whom there are allegations of bribery. Giving and accepting bribe is a criminal offence. There is no technicality involved in that. If that logic were accepted, then the income tax people would also say that income tax is a very complex subject and only people with income tax backgrounds should deal with allegations of corruption against income tax officers. There would be similar demands from politicians, customs officers and other sections of bureaucracy.
But the proceedings for impeachment of judges  is already provided in the Constitution. Are you suggesting an amendment to the Constitution?	We are not seeking any amendment to the constitution. We are not even touching the provisions relating to impeachment of judges as provided in the constitution. We are not even talking of impeachment. All that we are saying is that the power to grant permission to register FIR against a judge should be given to a seven member bench of Lokpal rather than the CJI.
What will happen to the Judicial Accountability Bill presented by the Government?	Judicial Accountability Bill does not talk of bribery by the judges. It only talks of professional misconduct. Jan Lokpal talks of criminal misconduct. Therefore, the two bills complement each other. The National Judicial Commission sought to be created through Judicial Accountability Bill will not have the police and investigative powers and machinery to deal with criminal complaints of bribery. It could be done only by Lokpal.
Complaints against Lokpal members will go to Supreme Court and those against Supreme Court judges will go to Lokpal. Would that not create some kind of circularity?	Such circularity is a part of internal checks and balances at top levels in any democracy. For instance, Supreme Court keeps a check on legislature and Executive and the Legislature has powers to legislate on judicial matters. If there is a complaint against a Supreme Court judge and a Lokpal member at the same time, then obviously, the accused judge or the accused member will recuse himself from the benches. If ever such an eventuality happens, the transparency of proceedings in the two institutions will keep a check on the possibility of any misuse. The hearings at the two places will be open for the public and media.
Won’t we need to amend the constitution to allow a seven member bench of Lokpal to give permission rather than the CJI under the existing system?	No, we won’t need any amendment. There is no provision either in the constitution or in any law which empowers the CJI to give permission before registration of an FIR against any judge. Such a system was created by the Supreme Court through an order in Veeraswamy case, in which the SC made it mandatory that permission would need to be sought before registration of an FIR against any judge. Interestingly, no frivolous FIR had ever been filed against any judge before that judgement and such a judgement was completely uncalled for